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Abstract: Taken as a whole, the findings of educational research are often inconclusive;
far too many competing ideas and thus difficult for policy makers to decide what to
believe, unless it says what they really want to hear. An alternative is to seek help from the
much more ‘scientifically reliable’ findings of neuroscience. Perhaps this will provide a
means of uniting education policy and research. For example, it should be possible to
scan the brains of children to see whether they are likely to become vicious criminals and
so isolate them, before they commit crimes. Will this be the policy makers’ final solution to
the problem of children’s anti-social behaviour? Philosophers of education and teacher
educators need to provide informed responses to the evidence of neuroscience and its
implications, making sure they are on-target. This paper presents some relevant
neuroscientific evidence regarding empathy, truth and free-will, and engages in some
preliminary target practice.

Education Theory and Education Policy – The Backdrop
On my desk there’s a small booklet with a green paper-back cover bearing the title Teachers
Mistaught. It was published in 1990, in the UK, by the Centre for Policy Studies. Its author is Shelia
Lawlor. It is hard to imagine that this small book caused such immense anguish within British
education faculties, and such curiosity overseas - especially in Australasia and the US. Yet it did, and
for two main reasons; first, the Centre for Policy Studies was the think-tank of the then ‘New Right’
and it strongly influenced the Thatcher government’s policy-making and, second, it proposed closing
down all university faculties of education. As the title suggests, its immediate focus of attack was
teacher education, but Lawlor and her associates had little respect for education as an academic study;
believing it to be a hot-bed of leftist theory that bedevils the whole educational enterprise. With regard
to teacher education, Lawlor claimed that:
Instead of putting the mastery of the subject at the heart of the course, as the essential
foundation for good teaching, the training courses demeans the subject to being little more
than a peg on which to hang modish educational theory (ibid., p.42).
The solution to this problem, she argued, is:
… that both PGCE and B.Ed. courses be abolished - and with them the university
departments of education. Instead, graduates will, as happens in other professions, train on
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the job and be paid a salary from the outset (ibid.).
And those currently employed in faculties of education in universities should be:
… offered the choice of going into school-teaching at a senior level; of taking early
retirement; or, if they were distinguished academically, of moving to the department of a
university where their subject (English, maths, physics etc.) is studied (ibid., p.38).
Lawlor’s claims about the distorting influence of theory in teacher education were supported by
reference to the prospectuses of a number of teacher education institutions, including London
University, Institute of Education (IOE). That has personal significance, because in 1989 I had been
appointed to direct a major course and staff development project at the IOE, having previously been a
member of the lecturing staff. By 1990, when the Lawlor publication surfaced, we were in the process
of putting together the London Area-based Scheme, a pioneering school-based teacher education
course. Though some of us briefly deliberated whether to continue we kept going, believing with
colleagues at Oxford in the school-based approach. That was timely. Margaret Thatcher ceased to be
Prime Minister and the subsequent government, under John Major, made the school-based approach
compulsory. We suddenly found ourselves in the lead 1.
There are two main conclusions I want to draw from the account just given. First, governments are
in no way bound to trust education theorists on any matters to do with education policy and practice.
They and their political allies may be deeply suspicious of education theory and look elsewhere for
advice. Second, it is always wise to be one step ahead of the game, if possible. I take it that both
conclusions are non-trivial. Taking these two as a backdrop, my main strategy in this paper is not to
produce a commentary on philosophical texts, but rather to comment on certain findings within
neuroscience. Perhaps, by analogy, one might consider the theoretical construct of neuroscience to be a
text, though in that case it would be more accurate to use the plural, as neuroscience comprises many
sub-disciplines. There are, I suggest, good reasons to believe that neuroscience will increasingly bear
on education and will be perceived as having practical utility by policy makers. Those in education,
including philosophers of education, need to be one step ahead. The key question I wish to open up in
the first half of the paper is ‘why do school students frequently misbehave and what can be done about
it’? Is the source of misbehaviour primarily social and environmental, or is it to be found in the
biology of the brain? The second half will begin by considering the philosophical tools required when
contributing to the neuroscientific debate, before addressing issues of empathy, truth and freewill.

The Problem of Student Behaviour
Whenever I’ve asked student teachers about their worries when going into school to practice,
they’ve consistently identified two main concerns - subject knowledge and classroom discipline.
Lawlor was right about the importance of subject knowledge. Worries about children’s behaviour in the
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classroom, on the other hand, not only afflict newly qualified teachers; they remain a major cause of
concern and mental stress throughout many a teacher’s career. Arguably, this is the biggest issue that
teacher education courses the world over have consistently failed to resolve. Yet, problems of
classroom management, as they are often rather evasively called, have produced a veritable industry
over the years. We have had behaviourist conditioning theories and strategies, assertiveness techniques,
reality therapies, and the child-centred approaches, to name just a few. But, however convincing these
psychological theories may appear in theory, my impression, from my own school teaching experience
and from observing student and newly qualified teachers over the years, is that they are of limited
practical use in dealing with misbehaving children. And if they do not deliver, they are not going to
appeal to policy makers concerned to make good on election promises regarding juvenile crime and its
links to disruptive school behaviour, especially if a better, more reliable alternative is at hand.
Arguably, one of the problems of the psychological approaches mentioned above is that, despite
their very real differences, they all assume that it is the environmental background that mainly
underscores children’s behaviour, not their brains. So, for example, within child-centred psychology,
Karl Rogers was at pains to emphasise that children are born prior to good and evil; nurturing and
upbringing are the decisive factors that account for differences. At the other end of the spectrum,
behaviourists placed their emphasis on environmental conditioning techniques of one kind and another.
They, in particular, believed that psychology had no need to consider the brain or the intervening
mental processes within the brain that underlie perception, attention, memorising, planning, thinking
and action. Perhaps, however, we do need to consider the biology of the brain; perhaps that is where
one should look to find the source of behaviour and misbehaviour, though remembering, of course, that
the biological processes of the brain are constantly responding to environmental experience. Not
surprisingly, many people working within the neurosciences stress the biological factors. Maybe, for
anxious policy makers, the evidence of neuroscience is the better alternative, now at hand?
Consider, for example, issues of empathy, truth-telling and freewill. These are clearly of the
greatest importance in regard to student behaviour. The ability to think oneself into another person’s
situation and be considerate of their feelings would appear to be essential in regulating the extent of
one’s behaviour. And we generally assume, on prima facie evidence, that all human beings possess the
ability to empathise, though we may not all exercise it consistently or to the same extent
Similarly,
we believe, at least in principle, given a normally functioning brain, that it is possible to give a
factually truthful account, based on an accurate recall of events. In other words, one could not sincerely
and honestly recall events that did not occur. And though we all realise that we are often constrained in
what we do, we nevertheless believe that the actions of both adults and children are under the control of
the conscious mind, allowing us to choose what we do and when we do it.
The point is that each of the claims just made in regard to empathy truth and freewill are denied on
the basis of recent neuroscientific evidence, though admittedly some of the original research predates
that evidence. In short, not everyone is able to experience and exercise empathy; we can honestly recall
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events that did not occur, and; the conscious brain is not in total control of behaviour. Moreover,
many of those working in the neurosciences anticipate that it may not be long before it is possible to
scan the brains of young children to identify those most likely to end up committing serious violent
crime, such as rape and murder. It is then but a short step for neuroscientists such as Professor Gerhard
Roth at Bremen University to say that such people should be isolated from society before they commit
a dreadful crime, as one would isolate someone with a highly infectious, deadly disease 2. The potential
benefits of screening children will not be lost on governments and policy makers, especially when it
comes with all the credibility that accompanies the evidence of ‘real science’. Not only might it provide
a lasting solution to the most serious problems of misbehaviour in schools, it could also begin to
eliminate the problem of juvenile crime and, in the long term perhaps, all violent crime as potential
offenders are identified in advance of their committing a crime. On March 27th 2007, in the UK, the
then Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that all children could be required to take tests to find out
whether they are at risk of becoming criminals. The Government, we were told, plans to:
…establish universal checks throughout a child’s development to help service providers to
identify those most at risk of offending…. These checks should piggyback on existing contact
points such as the transition to secondary schools (Topping, 2007).
Though the UK Government did not specify what form the ‘universal checks’ will take, one can
assume they will include fMRI screening, where the brains of children will be monitored while they
view selected images. The reaction to this announcement by the National Association of Head
Teachers (NAHT) in the UK was as predictable as it was off-target. General Secretary Nick Brooke
was reported 3 as saying that he does not know what purpose this will serve and it is very difficult to
see what schools can do without simply labelling children as potential criminals. Assuming he was
reported correctly, does he really believe it will serve no purpose to identify those children most at
risk? Will it not serve a major purpose for government? And, could it not be an act of deep
compassion, providing the first step on the road to recovery for those children who are identified?
Screening does not necessarily lead to children being criminalised. We have all become used to
security and health screening at airports without feeling we are being criminalised. It is not the
screening, as such, that gives rise to a feeling of being criminalised, but how one is treated after being
identified as having a problem. Though I have little interest in what the NAHT says, I am concerned
with what education theorists, particularly philosophers of education, might say about these complex
issues.

The Role of Philosophy Within the Neurosciences
Though there are a number of very able philosophers already contributing to debate within the
neurosciences, in education we need more. There is also a very real need for students in teacher
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education courses to think deeply about the relevant philosophical issues 4; particularly at the M.Ed.
level. Philosophers in education can bring all their normal tools of argumentation and critical analysis,
but they also need two additional tools. First, though the neuroscientific literature is too vast to cover in
detail, they do require an accurate understanding of key themes being discussed, including some
acquaintance with the primary texts of neuroscience; not simply secondary texts in which philosophers
discuss the primary texts. Within education, empathy, truth (related to memory) and freewill (and
morality) are key themes, as I hope to show shortly.
Second, philosophers need a historical perspective, in order to contextualise their understanding of
neuroscience. And, as many working in neuroscience come from a background in psychology, we need
to be cognisant of previous psychological baggage they may be bringing to the debate. Some of which
is productive, some not. The idea that philosophers need a grasp of history is not at all new in the
philosophy of science, at least in its post-positivist development since the first half of the twentieth
century. The connection is very clear, for example, in the work of Thomas Kuhn. If one wants to fully
understand The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), one would do well to study his earlier work,
The Copernican Revolution (1957), arguably the best historical treatment of that period of science,
where one will find in embryonic form the better known concepts of The Structure. In mainstream
philosophy, however, there is a tendency to discuss ideas with no regard for their historical context.
When reading the philosophy of mind, one sometimes wonders whether Descartes is still thought to be
alive. By contrast, I wonder whether Descartes would be a Cartesian if he were alive today. Actually, I
very much doubt it.
My overriding hope, partly coming from my experience of raising these issues in the past, is that
philosophers will not be prevented from taking the neurobiological evidence seriously, because of the
current emphasis within philosophy on language and the social embeddedness of our being and
discourse. Not everything is reducible to environmental and social influence; we are neuro-social
beings, the brain constitutes who we are and what we do. With that in mind, let us look at the evidence
and the claims being made in regard to empathy, truth and freewill.

Experiencing Empathy
In setting out the case for The Biological Basis of Crime, Adrian Raine (2002) notes that, up to the
time of his writing, criminologists and sociologists have largely ignored the evidence coming from
neuroscience. He speculates that this may in part ‘be due to deep-seated historical and moral suspicions
of a biological approach to crime’ (Ibid., p.43). He does not mention philosophers, but I sense that
many share those same suspicions. Raine, formerly a British Home Office forensic psychiatrist, but
now a professor at the University of Southern California, has been at the forefront of research using
brain imaging that claims to show that the brains of criminals are physically different from
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non-criminals. For example, in one such study conducted in 2000, with a sample of twenty-one males
identified as having Antisocial Personality Disorder, a normal control group of thirty-four males and a
further control sample of twenty-seven males with Substance Dependence, it was found that:
Antisocials had significantly lower prefrontal grey volumes than both
Controls and Substance Dependents. In contrast, groups did not differ on
white prefrontal volume, indicating specificity of the deficit to grey matter
(neurons) (Raine, 2002, p.60).
Similar deficits in the prefrontal lobes (behind the forehead) of violent criminals have now been
confirmed in brain scans many times over. What makes this finding particularly significant is that the
prefrontal lobes are that part of the brain mainly implicated in the exercise of empathy and what
Damasio (1994) calls secondary emotion essential to the exercise of a balanced rationality. The
conclusion seems to be that this deficit leads to a weakened functioning of the prefrontal lobes where,
at worst, the person has no sense of empathy, because their brains cannot process it. They are severely
handicapped, as they cannot mentally simulate feelings, even feelings of what it will be like if they are
punished. This handicap may work itself out in different ways. In experimental situations, for example,
where subjects are shown horrific images, many murderers and rapists show minimal or no response
compared with considerable activity in the prefrontal lobes of ‘normal’ subjects. In every day life,
those with this deficit will be strongly inclined to seek stronger stimuli, often through violent activity or
placing themselves at risk, because their brains do not respond to ordinary events.
Further studies of those classified as psychopaths have revealed that additional areas of the brain
are implicated when it comes to fear of being caught after committing crimes. In 2004, Raine examined
the brains of what he called ‘successful psychopaths’, those who had committed crimes but not been
caught and ‘unsuccessful psychopaths’ that had been caught 5. Both groups shared common deficits
that caused them to lack empathy and thus show little or no consideration for others. However, there
were marked differences between the two groups in regard to hippocampal impairments, located in the
temporal lobes (side of the head). Raine and his team found that while less than half of the successful
psychopaths and the control group had an asymmetrical hippocampus, in ninety-four percent of the
unsuccessful psychopath the right side was larger than the left. The importance of this is seen in the
role the hippocampus plays in laying down memories in the brain. The normal hippocampus, it is
claimed, allows the successful psychopaths the ability to learn to fear getting caught, which aids them
in the strategies they employ to avoid capture. In addition to the prefrontal lobes and the hippocampus,
other areas where impairments in violent criminals have been located include the corpus callosum
(where the two halves of the brain join) and the left angular gyrus, which is located at the junction
between the temporal, parietal (top rear of head) and occipital (rear of head) lobes.
What are we to make of all this? Well, first let me say that this research is something of a
thriving industry, so at best I have only begun to give a flavour of the claims being made 6. It is this
kind of evidence, particularly with regard to empathy and its emotional correlates, which has led to
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claims that as soon as the technology is sufficiently improved it should be used to isolate those with
these kinds of deficits and keep them in secure premises before they commit a crime. As this idea may
seem reprehensible, let me ask a question. If it is the case that those who cannot experience empathy
are at a very high risk of committing violent crime, and if it is possible through screening to identify
them, would it be morally wrong not to do so? Imagine a future scenario in which a fourteen year old
boy committed a horrific murder; he had been a constant source of trouble at school, but the head
teacher, not wanting to criminalise the boy, had persuaded his parents to resist screening. And the story
gets out to the press. Or, imagine a situation where the technology is available but a government
refuses to use it on ethical grounds. And then there is a spate of killings. My point is that society and
governments will likely back the implementation of screening despite any ethical misgivings they may
have, when it becomes reliable. This places a very heavy onus on the neuroscientific community to tell
the truth about the status of their findings, despite pressures on them to pursue careers and meet
research targets.
As researchers within education, many of the questions we should ask about this research are
familiar enough. I have mentioned the vast extent of the research, but how significant are the findings?
What in all of this is evidence and what is interpretation, or even speculation? What is the counter
evidence, and so forth? My own assessment is that in regard to the correlation between deficits in
the prefrontal lobes and the lack of empathy and emotion there seems to be very strong evidence, there
really are people unable to empathise, but between that and consequent acts of violent crime the figures
are less than convincing. It is not enough to show statistical significance; there would need to be a very
close correlation before even thinking of incarcerating potential offenders. Ideally, one would want to
know that everyone who has the specific deficit to the brain will end up committing violent crime.
There is no such evidence. Moreover, as neuroscientist Steven Rose has emphasised many people who
are diagnosed as psychopathic do not show brain abnormalities. He therefore believes that the
predictive power of a brain scan is currently close to zero. He also points out that even ‘if differences in
the scans do in fact match differences in behaviour, these are correlations, not causes’ (Rose, 2005,
p.271).
There is, however, another side to this issue. Though brain scans cannot at the moment be used
predicatively with regard to criminality, they can reveal deficits to the brain that accompany the
inability to empathise, and thus identify children who might be at risk. This is what I think the British
Government is latching onto. The justifiable question then arises, what causes such deficits and what
might be done about them? Both Raine and Rose agree that though there may be genetic factors at
work much of the cause would seem to stem from upbringing, particularly in the early years of
development. If that is the case, then maybe something can be done about it. The main policy
implication then becomes that children at risk need to be reached, possibly in the first two to three
years, not in order to incarcerate and criminalise them, but rather to assist in the development and
medical repair of their brains. Raine speculates that:
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Two hundred years from now we may have reconceptualised recidivistic criminal behaviour
as a clinical disorder with its roots in early social, biological and genetic forces beyond the
individual’s control (Raine, 2002, p.74).
I am not sure why he thinks it will take that long. I do agree with him when he says that: ‘Biology
is not destiny, and we can benignly change many of the biological predispositions that shape the violent
offender’ (ibid, p.43). But, I am also aware that there is a thin dividing line between the use of this
research to heal broken minds or, alternatively, to criminalise those identified as not desirable. All in
education need to keep a very close watch on the intentions of policy makers. Philosophers, in
particular, need to join with those in neuroscience such as Rose in keeping the claims emanating from
this research under the closest scrutiny. This is not a fantasy scenario; it is coming sooner than later.

Telling the Truth
If experiencing empathy is a problem for some people, telling the truth is a problem for us all. The
key to the problem is memory; false memory. Much of the pioneering work on false memory was
conducted in the 1970’s by Elizabeth Loftus, at the University of Washington in Seattle, and it is
ongoing. It is also highly controversial, particularly in America which, historically, has invested so
heavily in psychoanalysis and in litigation. The claim that memory is unreliable, and that it is entirely
possible to sincerely and honestly recall events that did not occur, is anathema to those engaged in
getting their clients to recall repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, as it is for lawyers seeking
watertight convictions based on eye-witness testimony 7.
Loftus has appeared as an expert witness at more than 200 trials. At the same time, she is a thorn
in the flesh of neo-Freudian movements such as Recovered Memory Therapy. Not surprisingly, she has
been subjected to considerable verbal abuse by those opposing her views and their supporters in the US
national press. One means of attacking her work has been to claim that her psychological methods do
not comply with the supposed rigors of the ‘scientific method’, a seventeenth-century construct that
many in psychology and psychiatry still seem to cling to, even though it is largely discredited.
However, this accusation is becoming less telling as her findings are gaining considerable support from
neuroscience, in two main ways. First, in what we are learning about the distributed and reconstructive
nature of memory, which is very different from the ‘memory’ of a serial computer, and second from
brain imaging studies.
There is no centre in the brain where complete memories are stored, therefore for a memory to
occur its component parts have to be gathered from different areas of the brain and brought together in
what Damasio describes as a ‘trick of timing’ (Damasio, 1994, p,95). Every memory is a reconstruction
and each reconstruction will, moreover, depend on many factors including mood and situation. What
we remember is also dependent on circumstance, as we perceive what we find meaningful in preference
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that which we do not. Perhaps, if each neuron in the brain stored one discrete and complete memory, as
once believed, it would be much easier to assume that memory can be reliably recalled. However, the
distributed and reconstructed nature of memory is much more in keeping with the notion of fallible
truth-telling described by Loftus.
Corroborating evidence for the notion of false memory comes from imaging studies in which a
subject is shown a film sequence of everyday activities, but the film has a number of gaps where
connecting events are missing. The subject is then asked to remember what she saw, while her brain is
being scanned by MRI. Which incidents did she actually see and which were left out of the film, the
gaps? Consistently, subjects compose a composite of what they actually saw and what they did not
see; the brain tends to fill in the gaps. However, what is particularly interesting is that the brain images
show that different areas of the brain are activated when the subject is recalling images that were seen
and when creating those that were not. The subject however is unaware of creating anything; she thinks
she is recalling what she saw.
Again, what should be our response? The notion of an honest liar may not be easy to swallow,
but are philosophers duty-bound to oppose the conclusions of this research on the grounds of defending
the traditional moral and legal notion of telling the truth? Or, should philosophers respond by
redefining notions of honesty and truth telling? One may notice, of course, that the traditional concept
of truth telling is closely akin to the correspondence theory of truth, which many philosophers of
science find less than convincing. In the correspondence theory of truth, a statement is true if it
corresponds with the facts. In the traditionally notion of telling the truth, a statement is truthful if it
corresponds with an honest recall of the facts. Loftus’ research, at the very least, cautions against the
assumption that telling the truth is simply a matter of being honest. In other words, the notion of
honesty needs to be redefined, perhaps making it a matter of intent. There is important philosophical
work needing to be done here. At a more general level, while much harm has been done to people who
have genuinely been abused, a lot of hurt has also been caused to good people when, because of false
memory claims, they have been wrongly accused of abusing others. What is tragic is that many of these
false memories have been ‘recovered’ by psychotherapy and counselling, which often presents itself as
science 8.

Freewill and Conscious Choice
Earlier in this paper I expressed the hope that philosophers will acknowledge that not everything is
reducible to environmental and social factors, and I noted that some philosophers may be suspicious of
biological approaches to behaviour, which could prevent a productive dialogue with neuroscience.
There is another problem that philosophers need to avoid when engaging with neuroscience, and that is
importing their cherished forms of thought into the debate when they are not appropriate. A rather clear
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example can be found in a recent article by Jurgen Habermas (2007), in which he considers whether the
neurosciences pose a ‘genuine threat to the language game of responsible agency’ (p.13). He contrasts
this ‘language game’ with what he calls the ‘naturalistic’ language game of neuroscience. The use of
the metaphor ‘language game’ has certainly had its merits, historically, in allowing religious and moral
language back into the fold of rational discourse having been excluded by Positivism, but Habermas’
use of this metaphor, when addressing the current debate within neuroscience about freewill and
determinism, is a distraction. Moreover, it is not likely to appeal to those working in neurobiology,
which would not make it inappropriate if the metaphor is crucial to the philosophical argument, but in
this case it is not. As John Searle pointed out in his response to the Habermas article:
… he does not seem to realise that the two language games can simply be matters of different
levels of description of one and the same system…. There is one level of description of my
mental processes where they can be described as neurobiological processes in the brain.
There is another level of description of those very same processes where they intrinsically
have intentionalistic and semantic properties (Searle, 2007. p.71).
In a previous paper on The Neuronal, Synaptic Self (Sankey, 2006), I suggested that ‘each human
being is a multileveled psychosomatic unity; a biological organism and a responsible self making
choices and having values’. Rather than Habermas’ notion of competing language games, this seems to
me to be a more appropriate basis on which to engage with biologists on issues of freewill and agency.
It is an idea they understand and many accept.
Searle also takes Habermas to task for misrepresenting contemporary neurobiological research, by
portraying its view of the brain as a highly mechanistic physical system and contrasting that with our
self-conception as conscious, free and rational beings. Searle is certainly correct to say that the notion
of consciousness is now widely acknowledged within neuroscience, but there is still a strong tendency
to dismiss the notion of freewill and moral agency. This is not simply based on the acceptance of the
naturalistic argument that the world is essentially a deterministic system. It is also based on
experimentation, many examples being variations on the original work of Benjamin Libet, conducted in
the 1960’s, in which a subject is wired to an EEG that monitors brain wave responses and is then
placed in front of a clock with just one moving hand rotating at a rate of seconds. The subject watches
the hand and is then asked to choose a moment to stop the hand. Perhaps she decides to stop at the
point of 45 seconds. That is what she reports, but her brain waves reveal that though she consciously
chose to stop the hand at 45 seconds, her brain had already decided to do so in advance. Quite literally,
the brain is faster than you think! It seems that it is not our conscious mind that makes the decision,
but instead the sub-conscious mind. In that case the conscious mind is not in control, though we think it
is. Where, then, does this leave the notion of freewill?
My response to this has been to point out that what this highly repeatable experiment shows is not
that there is no control; rather it is not conscious control. In short, I believe that philosophers in
particular have placed far too much weight on consciousness as the defining characteristic of
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personhood (ibid., p.168), which may partly be a legacy of Descartes’ mind/body dualism. If, however,
we view each human self as a multileveled psychosomatic unity, the notion that we are both conscious
and sub-conscious selves is not problematic. Indeed, much of what we do, including all non-declarative
memory (Ryle’s ‘knowing how’) is located in the sub-conscious mind, and who believes that our
know-how ability is not under control when, for example, we ride a bicycle without thinking about it or
‘automatically’ drive home when deep in conversation? Incidentally, non-declarative memory is
possibly the only memory available to invertebrate animals, as they do not have a hippocampus and
other supporting structures required for declarative (knowing that) memory.
At the moment we simply do not know whether the brain is a deterministic system or not. There is
certainly some opinion that it may not be (Freeman, 1999). In any event, this is an empirical issue and
not a philosophical one, though the status accorded to the empirical findings and their relevance to the
issue of freewill are philosophical issues. Our sense that we have freedom to choose may not be
illusory. It may simply be that we are not yet in a position to unravel this apparent mystery. For the
time being, my approach is to draw on Willard Quine’s notion of underdetermination. He applied it to
scientific theories, pointing out that all are underdetermined by the facts. My suggestion is that we are
all beset by a multitude of determinisms in our lives, yet we remain underdetermined; we do have the
ability to make choices, even though these may not all be consciously held in the mind.

Conclusion
Philosophers seem to spend a lot of time arguing over dead-men’s clothes, when there may be
more pressing issues needing attention. In our rapidly changing world, no area of human understanding
is expanding and changing more rapidly than neuroscience. Plato, Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche,
Wittgenstein, Foucault, Derrida and Rorty are all dead and, though they played a pivotal role when
alive, their ideas have to be viewed within the context of their time. As Rorty himself acknowledged in
regard to what he called edifying philosophers, their ‘work looses its point when the period they are
reacting against is over’ (Rorty, 1979, p.369). For most of them, brain imaging techniques such as
fMRI and PET scans were over their horizon, out of sight and mind, yet these technologies are now
helping to redefine our understanding of what were traditionally philosophical issues, including the
nature of the self (including empathy), truth and moral accountability. That should be of interest to
present-day philosophers.
Moreover, unless I am greatly mistaken, the claims of neuroscience will increasingly influence
education policy, particularly in regard to student behaviour and how it is dealt with, which should be
of interest to philosophers of education. Though neuroscience is not the final solution to the policy and
research issue in education, its ‘scientific’ status may well be considered authoritative by policy
makers. Its claims, however, need to be held up to constant scrutiny, or there is a very real possibility it
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may become another form of final solution; one reminiscent of the Holocaust. I am aware that in this
paper I have barely made a start in addressing these issues, though I hope I have gone some way in
opening them up for consideration.
Notes
1. An interesting window on those turbulent times in the UK can be found in collected papers in
Wilkin & Sankey, Collaboration and Transition in Initial Teacher Training.
2. A view expressed by Roth on a television programme called The Source of Evil, broadcast by
DW-TV in autumn 2006
3. Reported on the Yahoo.com UK, News webpage of 27th March 2007: Children ‘may face criminal
checks’.
4. For an introductory discussion suitable for students of education see my chapter on Education and
the Philosophy of Mind and Brain, in Tan, C. (Ed.) (2008). Philosophical Reflections for Educators.
5. An interesting distinction! Presumably the researcher’s identification of the ‘successful
psychopaths’ was clinical rather than criminal.
6. Raine’s own research output is prodigious, but the extent of the literature will become immediately
apparent by going to Google and entering the search words ‘biological basis of crime’
7. Loftus’ co-authored book The Myth of Repressed Memory makes fascinating reading, but one may
see the extent of the opposition to her work by simply going to Google and typing in Elizabeth
Loftus.
8. For a well presented female perspective on the Recovered Memory Movement, see Paula Tyroler’s
1996 paper
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